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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY
a conflict between the Rules and the CPLR, the CPLR would
govern.71
CPLR 3123: Court excuses failure to respond to notice to admit.
Under CPLR 3123, notice to admit, a party may serve his
adversary with a written request to admit matters of fact so as to
expedite the trial by eliminating the necessity of proving matters
not in dispute.7 2  If no reply is made within twenty days, or at a
time set by the court, the matters contained in the notice to admit
are deemed admitted. If the answering party finds it difficult to
categorically admit or deny, he can so state in a sworn statement
specifying his claim.7 3  Under subdivision (b) a party may apply
to the court to amend or withdraw his admission,7 4 and any
admissions made are subject to all pertinent objections to admissi-
bility which may be interposed at trial.
In Marguess v. City of New York75 defendant city failed to
respond to plaintiff's notice to admit but, the appellate division, first
department, nevertheless affirmed dismissal of the complaint. Rely-
ing heavily on that portion of subdivision (b) which allows an
objection to admissibility to be made, the majority excused the
defendant's total failure to respond on the ground that plaintiff's
demands, relating to questions of ultimate liability, were not attuned
to any reasonable belief that they were free from substantial dis-
pute, and thus, admissible matter.76
The dissent interpreted the provisions of 3123 to mean that
defendant's failure to respond to the notice to admit established a
prima facie case against it. Deeming the trial court to lack the
power to excuse a total failure to comply with the demand, sub-
division (b) was construed as intended merely to reserve for the
trial court questions as to relevancy, materiality and competency of
71 CPLR 101 states that the CPLR "govern[s] the procedure in civil
judicial proceedings in all courts of the state and before all judges, except
where the procedure is regulated by inconsistent statute."
72 In re Collins, 31 Misc. 2d 754, 222 N.Y.S.2d 89 (Surr. Ct. N.Y.
County 1961); WACHTELL, Nmv Yom PRAcTiCE UNDER THE CPLR 264(2d ed. 1966).
73See Sidclair Realty Co. v. Schor, 95 N.Y.S.2d 839 (App. T. 1st Dep't
1950); In re Luckenbach, 196 Misc. 782, 96 N.Y.S.2d 244 (Surr. Ct. Kings
County 1949); Solof v. City of New York, 181 Misc. 956, 49 N.Y.S.2d
921 (App. T. 2d Dep't 1944).
74 CPLR 3103 is also applicable to 3123 so that the answering party
can attack the notice to admit in this way. See The Quarterly Survey
of New York Practice, 42 ST. JoHN's L. RPv. 436, 455-56 (1968).
7 30 App. Div. 2d 782, 291 N.Y.S2d 956 (1st Dep't 1968).
76See In re Kelly, 33 Misc. 2d 16, 19, 225 N.Y.S.2d 896, 898 (Surr.
Ct. N.Y. County 1962).
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facts admitted,7 7 and not as a means for excusing defendant's total
failure to respond.
Viewing section 3123 as a whole it seems clear that the dis-
senting opinion gives meaning to all of its provisions while the
majority's construction of subdivision (b)'s "admissibility" clause
renders some of the language in the statute sterile.
CPLR 3140: Court orders disclosure although appraisals not
intended for trial.
CPLR 3101(a) provides for "full disclosure of all evidence
material and necessary 8 in the prosecution or defense of an ac-
tion..... ." The work product of an attorney and material prepared
for litigation, however, is not obtainable for disclosure.7 9
In a recent condemnation case, City of Binghamton v. Arling-
ton Hotel, Inc.,0 defendant-respondent moved for an order direct-
ing discovery and inspection of appraisals made for appellant in
order to obtain Urban Renewal funds. Since the appraisals were
not "material prepared for litigation" under CPLR 3101(d), they
were not protected by its immunity from disclosure.
In affirming the supreme court's order allowing discovery and
inspection, the court cited CPLR 3140, as additional authority for
its holding. Under this section, the appellate divisions are author-
ized to adopt rules governing the exchange of appraisal reports
intended for use at trial.81 It was found that section, 3140 mani-
fests the legislative intent "to permit wider disclosure of all matters
material to the litigation of these matters and permit the equitable
and speedier disposition thereof." 82
7 See Rowland v. State, 10 Misc. 2d 825, 172 N.Y.S.2d 420 (Ct. Cl.
Albany County 1957); Rusnak v. Doby, 267 App. Div. 122, 123, 44 N.Y.S.2d
730, 731 (2d Dep't 1943). These cases were decided under CPA 322,
the predecessor of CPLR 3123. 7B McKINNY'S CPLR 3123, commentary
294 (1964). In Emery v. Maryland, 28 App. Div. 2d 631, 280 N.Y.S.2d
199 (3d Dep't 1967) the court construed similar language in the special
proceeding provisions of the CPLR in accord with the dissent in the
instant case.78 The Court of Appeals, in Allen v. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co.,
21 N.Y.2d 403, 235 N.E.2d 430, 288 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1968), has liberally
construed the phrase "material and necessary" so that disclosure is required
"of any facts . . . which will assist preparation for trial by sharpening the
issues and reducing delay and prolixity. The test is usefulness and reason."
Id. at 406-07, 235 N.E.2d at 432, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 452. See also 3 WEiN-
sTmN, KORN & MILLEa, NEW Yomx Crvr. PRAcrIcE 113101.07 (1967);
7B MCKiNNEY'S CPLR 3101, supp. commentary 3 (1968); The QuarterlySurvey of New York Practice, 43 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 302, 324 (1968).79CPLR 3101(c) and (d).
8030 App. Div. 2d 585, 290 N.Y.S.Zd 330 (3d Dep't 1968).
81 All four departments have adopted such rules; however, they are not
uniform, and the result has been conflicting supreme court decisions con-
struing the rules. See 7B McKiNNEY's CPLR 3140, supp. commentary
162 (1968).
82 30 App. Div. 2< at 587, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 332-33.
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